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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This matter was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court by
Order dated February 28, 2001, and this Court has jurisdiction under U.C.A.782a-3(j), as amended.
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD
OF REVIEW
Issue no. 1: Whether Buyer has adequately marshaled the evidence on
appeal.
Standard of review: To show that a factual finding is against the clear
weight of the evidence, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence
supporting the finding

and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally

insufficient to support the findings even viewing it in the light most favorable to
the court below. URAP 24(9); Oneida/ SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 P.2d
1051, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (UT App. 1994)
Issue no. 2: Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court's judgment that

Appellant

Christine White dba Allied Building

Components ("Buyer") is liable to Appellee Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc.
("Seller") under her Continuing Guaranty agreement with Seller ("Guaranty")
and her

Credit Application and Agreement with Seller ("Agreement") for
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unpaid invoices for roofing materials ordered in Buyer's name, sold, and
delivered.
Standard of review: "...Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses... It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of
law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum decision filed by the court..."
URCvP 52(a); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (UT 1994).
Issue no. 3: Whether the trial court's conclusion that Ms. White should
be personally liable is correct under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Standard of review: Application of particular facts to the legal standard
of estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness and its factual findings for clear error.
Nunlev v. Weststates Casing Servs, 1999 UT 100, 989 P.2d 1077 (UT 1999).
Issue no. 4: Whether the trial court's conclusion that Ms. White should
be personally liable is correct by application of the doctrines of apparent agency
and estoppel.
Standard of review:

To the extent application of these doctrines is

particularly fact dependent, Appellant submits that the standard of review
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should combine review for correctness on the legal issues and review for clear
errors on the factual issues clear error and allow appropriate discretion and
leeway to the trial court in applying the legal principles to the facts. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (UT 1994). The trial court should be allowed broad
discretion on the issue of estoppel. Nunley v. Weststates Casing Servs, 1999 UT
para. 31 ; 989 P.2d 1077, 1087 (UT 1999).
Issue 5: Whether the trial court's restriction on the scope of cross
examination was an abuse of discretion under URE 611(a) and (b).
Standard of review: The trial court has broad control over the mode and
manner of the examination of witnesses

which is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Russell v. Russell 852 P.2d 997 (UT 1993).
Issue no. 6: Whether any error in the trial court's exclusion of claims and
evidence pertaining to a separate warranty dispute between Seller and a thirdparty was harmless under URCvP 61.
Standard of review: An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
different outcome is high enough to undermine the appellate court's confidence
in the result. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch„ 817 P.2d 789 (UT 1991).
Issue no. 7: Whether Buyer should be required to pay Seller's costs on
appeal under URAP 34(a) and Seller's attorney's fees as provided by contract.
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SUPPLEMENT TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
III.

Supplemental Relevant Facts.1

1.

Kimberly Hendricks testified at trial that since 1995 she has been

president of Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. ("Mule-Hide") which is a
commercial roofing distributor which sells roofing products throughout the
United States exclusively through its authorized distributors. (Trial T. 22-23,
30). Before then, she was controller and vice president responsible for the
company's financial statements and for approving credit applications on the
order of two or three per year. (Trial T. 23-24).

She holds a degree in

accounting and finance and is a CPA. She is also an attorney licensed in
Wisconsin.( Hendricks, Trial T. 23)
2.

Mule-Hide stock is owned 100 percent by its parent company ABC

Supply Company which is a building materials distribution network.
(Hendricks, Trial T. 23).
3.

In 1993, Ms. Hendricks received a credit application to Mule-Hide

from Ron Case Roofing

doing business as Allied Building Components.

(Hendricks, Trial T. 29-30, 31). She testified the

application was rejected.

(Hendricks, Trial T. 31-32) She explained the reasons. First, an important
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business principle for Mule-Hide is not to authorize roofing contractors who
use Mule-Hide products to become distributors. This would create a conflict of
interest by giving a contractor-distributor an unfair price advantage in the
market. (Hendricks, Trial T. 30). Second, Mule-Hide sells exclusively through
distributors and has historically done so as standard practice. Mule-Hide's
business would be destroyed if other distributors were to learn that Mule-Hide
was selling directly to roofing contractors. (Hendricks, Trial T. 30). Third,
because Mr. Case was not creditworthy. (Hendricks, Trial T. 30-31). In Ms.
Hendrick's opinion, "...he did not have personal assets in his name. It appeared
his personal assets were held elsewhere. (Hendricks, Trial T. 31).
4.

In 1994, Mule Hide had approximately 15 separate accounts with

its distributors. (Hendricks, Trial T. 23).
5.

On or about July 5, 1994, Christine White as a proprietor dba

Allied Building Components signed and submitted to Mule-Hide the subject
Agreement and Guaranty. (White, Trial T. 126, Plaintiffs trial exhibits 1 and 2,
Buyer's Addendum tabs 6 and 7). Ms. Hendricks personally had the authority
to determine for Mule-Hide whether to accept this new account. (Hendricks,
Trial T. 28). There were inadequate assets to justify authorizing credit and so a
personal guarantee based on sufficient personal assets was required by Mule1

Supplemental facts are needed to the extent that Buyer fails to marshal the evidence as discussed below.
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Hide and this was specifically discussed between Ms. Hendricks and Ms. White
during negotiations. (Hendricks, Trial T. 26-28, 32-33; White Trial T. 126)
6.

As part of negotiations, Ms. Hendricks specifically discussed with

Ms. White the need for a personal guarantee. ( Hendricks, Trial T. 35). At this
time, Ms. Hendricks understood Ron Case Roofing would be buying products
from ABC Supply as its primary customer. (Hendricks, Trial T. 35-36).
However, Ms. Hendricks was unaware that Ms. White was married to Ron Case.
Ms. Hendricks (Hendricks, Trial T. 35). In fact, Ms. White had been married to
Mr. Case for a long time and typically used her maiden name. (Buyer's counsel
during opening remarks, Trial T. 10; White, Trial T. 124, 131)
7.

The July 5, 1994 Credit Application and Agreement signed by

Christine White shows Allied Building Components Supply Co. is a
proprietorship of Ms. White's provides in part:
"The Credit Application is executed by Buyer to induce Mule-Hide
Products Co., Inc. ("MHPC") to extend credit to buyer. All purchases by
Buyer hereunder are made pursuant to MHPC's Purchase Agreement, the
Terms and Conditions of which have been read by Buyer and which are
incorporated by reference herein.
1.
Buyer shall pay each invoice in full in accordance with the
terms of the Particular Purchase Agreement, invoice, or other shipping
document, with or without Buyer's signature. In the event the Buyer fails
to make payment when due, Buyer agrees to pay, in addition to the
invoice amount, a monthly late payment charge of 1.5% of Buyer's
outstanding balance...

Oneida/ SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage. 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 872 P.2d 1051, 1053-1054 (UT App. 1994)
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2.
Buyer agrees to pay all costs of collection by MHPC of any
amounts due hereunder, including a reasonable attorney's fee...
6.
Buyer agrees to provide prompt, written notice of any
change in name, address, ownership, or form of business entity."
(Plaintiffs trial exhibit 1, Distributor's Addendum tab 6).
8.

The Continuing Guaranty signed by the Buyer provides in part:
"3. Binding Effect. Revocation. This Guaranty is a continuing
guaranty and shall remain in full force and shall be binding upon
Guarantor and Guarantor's heirs, executors, administrators, and
assigns notwithstanding the death of one or more of the
undersigned, until the expiration of thirty (30) days after written
notice by Certified or Registered Mail or revocation is received by
MHPC at its office first written above and until any and all of the
Indebtedness owed to MHPC and incurred prior to the expiration
of the thirty (30) day period shall have been fully paid." (Plaintiffs
trial exhibit 2, Buyer's Addendum tab 7).

9. Ms. White was unable to produce at trial evidence that she sent to
Mule-Hide written notice of revocation of her personal guaranty by certified or
registered mail. (White, Trial T. 138; Case, Trial T. 80)
10.

On or about February 22, 1997 Christine White and Ron Case

executed Articles of Organization of Ron Case Roofing Supply, L.L.C. and
since then have been members of the L.L.C. (Defendant's trial exhibit 18,
Buyer's addendum tab 17). Ron Case testified as to why the L.L.C. was formed:
"A: Well, we purchased a new piece of property over on Redwood Road,
and Chris had been wanting to get out of the distributing business, and so
I told her that would be a good time to do it, when we purchased this
property. We'd just close down Allied and Ron Case Roofing Supply
would take over." (Case, Trial T. 61)
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11.

The evidence at trial failed to show that Ms. White properly

notified Mule-Hide in writing of the change in her business form. The trial court
found no evidence showing that the February 13, 1998 "Dear Supplier" form
letter from Ron Case Roofing Supply, L.L.C. advising that Allied Building
Components was being purchased by Ron Case Roofing Supply, L.L.C. was
ever sent to Mule-Hide. (Defendant's trial exhibit 19; Rounds, Trial T. 102-103
Buyer's addendum tab 13, Court's ruling, T. 176).
12.

The evidence at trial failed to show that Mule-Hide agreed to

relieve Ms. White of her personal guaranty or to replace her guaranty with that
of Ron Case. Mule-Hide's July 29, 1998 collection letter addressed to Allied
Building Components attention Ron Case and other attempts to collect on the
debt other than against Ms. White do not operate as a waiver otherwise
prejudice Mule-Hide under the terms of the Agreement, paragraph 5. (Buyer's
Addendum, tab 6).
13.

Buyer's witness Dave Homerding testified he worked for Mule-

Hide beginning in

1993

regional sales manager and was involuntarily

terminated in August 1994. (Homerding, Trial T. 107, 109, 116). At the time of
trial Mr. Homerding was employed as a regional sales manager with Stay Fast
Roofing Products and had an ongoing business relationship with Ron Case.
(Homerding, Trial T. 107, 117).

12

14.

Mr. Homerding had dealings with ABC Supply at a time when he

believed it was owned by Christine White, but did not normally deal with her on
issues related to the company. He dealt with Ron Case. (Homerding, Trial T.
107-110, 117).
15.

In 1994, Mr. Homerding's job duties at Mule-Hide did not include

personally approving and setting up new accounts. (Homerding, Trial T. 118)
He would however recommend applicants to Ms. Hendricks. (Homerding, Trial
T. 118; Hendricks, Trial T. 28.)
16.
products

Mr. Homerding understood that as early as 1993 Mule-Hide sold
to Ron Case or to an entity with which

Mr. Case involved.

(Homerding, Trial T. 109, 117) Mr. Homerding assumed that Ron Case had an
existing authorized distributor account with Mule-Hide. (Homerding, Trial T.
110-111, 117-119) However, Mr. Homerding was unable to produce records
showing that and does not know that Mr. Case was authorized to purchase
product through the ordinary channels at Mule-Hide. (Homerding, Trial T. 118119). As mentioned above, Ms. Hendricks testified that the prior application of
Ron Case to become a distributor was denied. (Hendricks, Trial T. 147).
17.

Mr. Homerding at trial did not specifically recall people at Ron

Case Roofing Supply contacting him on the issue of erroneous billings to
Allied Building Components which should have gone to Ron Case Roofing
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Supply, or whether he passed any such information along to anybody else at
Mule-Hide. (Homerding, Trial T. 112, 114).
18.

A three page purchase order number 0004810 dated March 19,

1998 for the unpaid product at issue shows Allied Building Components
ordered from Mule-Hide Products Co., Inc. materials totaling a net order
amount of $35,932.00. The shipping directions were "Ship to: Allied Building
Components Sup.; 4731 W. 3500 So.; P.O. Box 70271; SLC, UT 84170." The
shipping address is the same address shown on the Credit Application and
Continuing Guaranty executed by Ms. White. (Plaintiffs trial exhibit 5, Buyer's
Addendum tab 11; Absence of dispute discussed in closing argument by
Buyer's counsel, T. 154; Hendricks, Trial T. p.41).
19.

Purchase orders are routinely processed at Mule-Hide by the

customer service department and if there is an open account they are processed
automatically. (Hendricks, Trial T. 40-41).
20.

Ms. White denied knowing about or authorizing the subject

purchase order which was faxed from Mule-Hide from the fax machine at the
office of Ron Case. (White, Trial T. 131, 137; Case, Trial T. 77-78).
21.

Mr. Case testified that Ron Case Roofing Supply, L.L.C. purchased

the subject materials and explained the basis for his answer as follows: "A:
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Well, Allied wasn't in business, so we had to purchase the material." (Case,
Trial T. 73-74).
22.

Mr. Case was unable to explain why the purchase order was in the

name of Allied Building Components. (Case, Trial T. 78).
23.

Mule-Hide in response to Allied Building Components Supply

Co.'s purchase order 004810 sold and shipped to Allied materials with charges
as shown on the following invoices:
a.

invoice 27509 dated 3/31/98 totaling

$25,758.25

b.

invoice 27542 dated 4/1/98 totaling

$310.00

c.

invoice 27560 dated 4/1/98 totaling

$615.32

d.

invoice 27615 dated 4/1/98 totaling

$2,235.50

c.

invoice 28098 dated 5/8/98 totaling

$6,799.29

INVOICES TOTAL

$35,718.36

(Plaintiffs trial exhibit 3; summarized in Defendant's trial exhibit 12,
Buyer's addendum tab 15).
24.

When the invoices were not paid, Ms. Hendricks personally made

twenty to thirty phone calls to Ms. White to obtain payment. Some of these
phone calls were answered in the name of Allied Building Components. Ms.
Hendricks personally spoke to Ms. White during some of these calls.
(Hendricks, T. 43-44). The explanations about non-payment given by Ms.
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White to Ms. Hendricks were that she did not have the money. Ms. Hendricks
testified:
"There was no—there was no issue of 'we didn't receive the material.' 4It
was invoiced incorrectly.' T don't owe the money to begin with.' None of
these issues were brought to my attention until litigation had started."
(Hendricks, T. 43-44).
25.

Ms. White denied under oath receiving any collection letters or

calls from Mule-Hide or having any contact with Mule-Hide since early 1997.
(White Trial T. 136).
26.

The trial court stated its findings of fact and conclusions of law on

the record and in open court at the close of the evidence. (Trial T. 176-181)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First, Buyer fails to marshal the evidence in her challenges to key factual
findings. To enable the Court of Appeals to determine whether the findings of
fact are clearly erroneous, appellant is required to play devil's advocate setting
forth in careful detail the evidence supporting the findings.

The Court of

Appeals should not consider the merits of Buyer's challenges to the findings of
fact.
Second, the credible evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's
conclusion. A purchase order regular on its face was submitted to Seller by fax
transmission in the name of Buyer as an authorized distributor of Seller's
products. Ms. White claimed that she had ceased business operations of her dba
16

and transferred the assets to a third-party L.L.C. of which she and her husband
Ron Case were members. The L.L.C. was not an authorized distributor. She
claimed that the order was placed without her knowledge or consent but in her
dba name by the L.L.C. However, the Agreement required Ms. White promptly
to notify Seller of any change in her business name, address, ownership or form
of business entity which she failed to do. Further, her continuing personal
guaranty had not been revoked by her in the manner required by contract before
the transaction. The trial court found that Seller acted reasonably and without
knowledge of the change in Ms. White's business. Further, the trial court found
Ms. White had knowledge of the activities of the L.L.C. The trial court had
evidence sufficient to support its conclusion that the order should be charged to
the account of Ms. White's dba and that she should be personally liable under
her continuing guaranty.
Third, the trial court's finding of liability against Ms. White is correct
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Ms. White had a duty promptly to
advise Mule-Hide of changes in her business name, operations, and ownership
and if she wished to revoke her guaranty to do so in writing. She failed to do
this and now claims that an entity which took over her dba should be charged
with the debt. Mule-Hide reasonably relied on her silence in filling the purchase
order submitted on the name of her account. Mule-Hide will be injured by
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nonpayment of the invoices and the additional amounts for its attorney's fees
and costs provided by contract if Ms. White is allowed

to repudiate the

purchase order.
Fourth, the trial court's finding of liability against Ms. White is correct on
application of the doctrines of apparent agency and estoppel to deny agency. A
principal is bound by the unauthorized acts of an agent clothed with apparent
authority. The doctrine of apparent agency focuses on the acts of the principal
from the perspective of a third party. If as Buyer claims, the Ron Case L.L.C.
took over buyers operations without notice to Mule-Hide and sent the purchase
order without Buyer's knowledge or consent the L.L.C. did so as the apparent
agent of Buyer. The Buyer's conduct creating apparent authority includes her
furnishing the L.L.C. with her account name and information for ordering from
Mule-Hide, and her silence about the change in business operations when she
had a contract duty to speak, and her failure to take prompt action to return or
take other appropriate steps with respect to the goods which she said she never
intended to order.
Fifth, the trial court's partial summary dismissing claims by a non-party
relating to a warranty dispute with Mule-Hide where those claims are the
subject of another lawsuit, and restricting accordingly the presentation of
evidence concerning those claims are mattes well within the trial court's

18

discretion. In any event, it is highly unlikely this evidence would have made a
difference in the bench trial, and any error is harmless.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: BUYER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
ANDTHE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT CONSIDER HER
CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
The daunting task of marshalling the evidence on appeal was explained in
Oneida/ SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 872 P.2d 1051,
1052-1053, (UTApp. 1994):
"Utah appellate courts do not take the trial courts' factual findings lightly.
We repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear
when challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's
findings of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate.
'[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and
fully assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the
[marshalling] duty..., the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very finding the appellant resists.' [citations omitted]
Once appellants have established every pillar supporting their adversary's
position, they then must 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence' and show
why those pillars fail to support the trial court's findings, [citation
omitted] They must show the trial court's findings are 'so lacking in
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making
them ' clearly erroneous.' [citation omitted]'" (emphasis original).
The consequence to appellants who fail properly to martial the evidence
when required is that the appellate court will not consider the merits of
challenges to the findings and will accept them as valid, (id. at 1053). Here,
Buyer has failed to marshal the evidence but has simply re-argued her case. The

19

Court of Appeals should therefore decline to consider the merits of any of her
challenges to the findings of fact and summarily affirm the judgment.
POINT TWO: THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS.
The standards of review for factual issues and legal issues was discussed
in State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 869 P.2d 932, (UT 1994):
".. .At the most basic level, two different types of questions are presented
to a trial court: questions of law and questions of fact. Factual questions are
generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions or
conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as the subjective, such
as state of mind, [citations omitted] Legal determinations, on the other hand, are
defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or principles
uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar
circumstances, [citation omitted]... Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate
court under the clearly erroneous standard...appellate review of a trial court's
determinations of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.'"
872 P.2d at 935-936).

" In a bench trial, the court must set forth the reasons for its decision in
enough detail for the reviewing court to determine whether they are clearly
erroneous." Lvsenko v. Sawaya, 973 P.2d 445, 448 (UT App. 1999). It is not
necessary for the trial court to resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues. In re
Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1248 (UT App. 1989).
As suggested in its remarks from the bench, the trial court found from
the evidence the following facts. Ms. White and Ron Case are husband and
wife. (T. 175). Mr. Case wanted to obtain a distributor agreement with Mule-
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Hide but could not, and so dealing together with his wife Ms. White he helped
her set up as a distributor. (T. 175). Ms. White dba ABC Supply executed the
Guaranty which provided for attorneys fees, she did not revoke it in writing by
certified or registered mail as required, and Seller relied on the Gauranty. (T.
175-176).

She obtained the necessary license for and operated the dba for a

time and then ceased operations. (T. 175). Ms. White and her husband Mr.
Case are principals of Ron Case Supply Co. (T. 177). Ron Case Supply Co. took
over ABC Supply and any inventory it had. (T. 177). However, Mule-Hide was
not notified. (T. 175-176) The purchase order faxed from the office of Ron
Case contained the same name and address of Ms. White's dba account with
Mule-Hide as appeared on her business license. (T. 177). The product ordered
was shipped and used by Ron Case Supply Co. without notice or objection
given to Mule-Hide. (T. 177) Ms. White knew what was taking place and did
not notify Mule-Hide. (T. 178). ABC Supply located in Salt Lake City was not
forthright with Mule-Hide located in Wisconsin and Mule-Hide is innocent of
any wrongdoing. (T. 177-178).
From the evidence outlined above, the trial court had ample reason to
discount the testimony of both Ms. White and Mr. Case as unreliable. The
testimony was biased and self-serving, implausible, and overcome by the weight
of other more credible evidence. Mr. Homerding's testimony was given little
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weight, consistent with his status as disgruntled ex-employee of Mule-Hide who
wants to do right by Ron Case with whom he has continuing business. Simply
put, the trial court had ample evidence to reach its findings and attached little
weight to Ms. White's evidence on the material matters.
POINT THREE: THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT MS. WHITE IS LIABLE UNDER HER
PERSONAL GUARANTY.
"Guaranty" in its primary and ordinary sense means to become
responsible for the fulfillment

of an agreement by another, to secure and

answer for the debt or default or the miscarriage of another. Mann v. Erie Mfg.
Co., 120 N.W.2d 711 (Wis. 1963). A guaranty is an undertaking or promise
which is collateral to a primary or principal obligation that binds the guarantor's
performance in the event of non-performance of the principal obligation.
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chisholm Bros. Farm Equipment, 525 P.2d 976,
978 (Idaho 1974) A contract of "continuing guaranty" contemplates a future
course of dealing extending over an indefinite period of time. (id. at 978). A
contract of guaranty may provide for greater liability than that

of the original

debtor, and a guarantor may be liable for his separate and independent promise
particularly when the language of the guaranty covers all indebtedness of "any
kind...in any manner, either primarily or secondary, absolutely or contingently,
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directly or indirectly...". Overland Park Sav. & Loan v. Miller, 763 P.2d 1092,
1093, 1100 (Kan. 1988).
In Commercial Nat. Bank v. Keene, 561 So.2d 813 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1990)
creditor bank sought to recover against a former partner under a continuing
guaranty

of debts of the partnership incurred 17 months after the partner

withdrew from the partnership and sold his interest. The continuing guaranty
guaranteed future debts of the partnership

but did not provide for revocation.

The partner sold his interest to his other partners and was released from all
obligations and the others agreed to indemnify him. Thereafter, the partnership
executed a promissory note which was not paid. The partner argued that the
bank through its attorney had knowledge of his release by the other partners
which constituted a written revocation of his guaranty. The court of appeals
disagreed, and wrote: "A continuing guaranty is not revoked merely by notice to
the creditor that a guarantor has sold his interest in a business entity to another
who thereafter also signs the guaranty.[citations omitted]" (id. at 815) Absent a
proper revocation, "The fact that he was not a partner when the debt was
incurred is not material or controlling.[citations omitted]" (id. at 816)
The guarantor unsuccessfully asserted the defenses of estoppel or laches.
"Those doctrines are applicable only where enforcement of the asserted right
would work injustice after excessive and unreasonable delay and after
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reasonable reliance by another on the inaction that results in harm." (id. at 816)
The court of appeals found no unreasonable day or justifiable reliance or
change in position and refused to apply the doctrines: "Whatley failed to revoke
the continuing guaranty to almost 17 months before the partnership incurred the
debt. His inaction and his attempted revocation after the debt was incurred and
demanded do not avail him." (id. at 816)
The evidence here amply shows Ms. White did not revoke her personal
guaranty. Her legal arguments that a personal guaranty may not be applied to
the debts of another or to the debts of an entity with which the guarantor is no
longer affiliated are incorrect and inconsistent with her express contract duties.

POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT MS. WHITE
SHOULD BE LIABLE IS CORRECT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND WAS APPROPRIATELY REASONED AND
ARTICULATED.
"The absence of written findings does not alter the duty of the [appellate
court] to sustain the trial court's order if we can do so on any proper grounds,
[footnote omitted]" Matter of Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 606-607, n.3 (UT
1982).
Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: "
(1) a statement, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a
claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission,
act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result
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from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement,
admission, act, or failure to act. [citations omitted]" CECO v. Concrete
Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-970 (UT1989)
Ms. White remained silent and

failed to take prompt and

appropriate action when she discontinued the operations of ABC Supply,
when those operations were taken over by Ron Case Roofing Supply of
which she was a principal which was not a qualified Mule-Hide
distributor and could not be, when a purchase order went out in the name
of her account from Ron Case Roofing Supply of which she was a
principal, and when Mule-Hide product arrived in Salt Lake which she
now claims she did not order. Mule-Hide acted reasonably and without
fault in reliance on her silence and inaction and will be injured if she is
permitted to assert this claim.
POINT FOUR: THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT MS. WHITE
SHOULD BE LIABLE IS CORRECT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
APPARENT AGENCY AND ESTOPPEL TO DENY AGENCY.
An agency relationship may exist without an express agreement
under the doctrine of apparent agency even where the acts of the agent are
unauthorized and adverse:
"It is a general principle of the law of agency, running through all
contracts made by agents with third parties, that the principals are bound by the
acts of their agents which fall within the apparent scope of the authority of the
agents, and that the principals will not be permitted to deny the authority of
their agents against innocent third parties who have dealt with those agents in
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good faith, [citation omittedTHorrocks v. Westfalia Systemat 892 P.2d 14, 1516(UTApp. 1995)
A principal who negligently or intentionally causes a third party to act on
an agent's apparent authority will be estopped to deny that authority if the third
party has detrimentally relied and it would be unjust to permit denial of the
authority, Kuehn v Kuehn, 642 P.2d 524, 526 (Colo. App. 1981).
POINT FIVE: NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN
LIMITING
CLAIMS
AND
RESTRICTING
EVIDENCE
AND
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR WAS
HARMLESS.
The trial judge here, both at the time of summary judgment and trial,
considered a separate warranty dispute in a separate lawsuit between a Ron
Case entity and Mule-Hide as not sufficiently related to the case at hand to
justify treating the two together. The discretion of the trial judge to separate
claims in this manner, and to restrict evidence balancing probative value against
waste and other factors, and to restrict the examination of witnesses accordingly
is broad and was not abused here. Further, given the core evidence not subject
to great dispute, any error is harmless.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the foregoing, Mule-Hide submits that no substantial error or
other reason warrants disturbing the trial court's judgment which should be
affirmed. The contract between the parties provides for attorney's fees to Mule-
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Hide and the trial court awarded fees on that basis. Mule-Hide respectfully
requests the appellate court to award it attorneys fees on appeal together with
costs.
7^V
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